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Abstract
Ambidexterity, the ability of firm to balance the need to explore for new and novel and
exploit its existing knowledge, skills and capabilities has become an important issue for
firms in these volatile times. What‘s been missing from this discussion is consideration of
how the unique character of family enterprises influences their investments in exploration
or exploitation? In this paper we develop a theoretical model to explain how the
governance and ownership characteristics of a family enterprise impact the family
enterprise‘s investments in exploration and exploitation activities. We contribute to the
literature on family enterprises by proposing that certain governance characteristics such
as the tenure of the generation in control, the proportion of senior management positions
controlled by the family, the dispersion of family ownership and the transfer of control to
the younger generation will all have certain effects on the investments in exploratory
activities. Building on the relational view of family enterprises, we suggest that the
characteristics of their relations with their employees and outside partners will influence
the level of investments in exploratory and exploitative activities. Our theoretical
standpoint within the context of organizational adaptation also shows that the two
seemingly contradictory theories of stewardship and agency can be reconciled.

Keywords: Family enterprises, organizational adaptation, exploration and exploitation,
ambidexterity
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Introduction
In a changing environment firms are constantly challenged to achieve the proper
balance between the two concurrent and potentially competing tasks of alignment and
adaptation (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). The organizational learning literature and the
recent literature on ambidexterity argues that in a dynamic environment, successful firms
are required to enhance the value of their existing capabilities and technologies through
exploitation, while at the same time developing valuable new capabilities through
exploration (Levinthal & March 1993; March, 1991). That is, an ambidextrous firm is the
one which, is capable of both exploiting existing competencies as well as exploring new
opportunities (Cao, Gedajlovic, & Zhang, 2009; pp.1). Nokia Corporation for example, in
the 1990s turned its losses into profits by constantly exploring for new capabilities while
simultaneously exploiting its traditional capabilities in wood, paper, materials and
consumer products (Masalin, 2003).
The need for an organization to pursue these two very different processes
simultaneously has led to the rapid expansion of the literature on exploration/exploitation,
more recently renamed ambidexterity and the acknowledgement by many organizational
scholars of the centrality of this issue to the modern organization. What is currently
missing from the discussion of exploration/exploitation is consideration of how family
ownership and control and the characteristics of that ownership, or ―familiness‖,
influences family firms‘ investments in exploration or exploitation.
Organizational adaptation was conceptualized in terms of exploration and
exploitation in March‘s seminal work (1991). Exploration is associated with search,
experimentation, risk taking, innovation and novelty, while exploitation is associated
with refinement, selection, production, and recombination of existing knowledge and
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capabilities (March, 1991; Dittrich & Duysters, 2007). In other words, exploration creates
variety in experience through search and discovery, while exploitation improves the value
derived from existing knowledge through routinization, refinement, production,
implementation and recombination (Holmqvist, 2004). Organizations innovate, in
general, by combining existing and new knowledge to create novel offerings (Kogut and
Zander, 1992). Therefore innovation depends on the flow of new knowledge into the
firm. Firms hoping to innovate must frequently turn to external sources to gain new ideas,
insights and expertise. This ability to acquire this knowledge from external entities is
however limited by an organization‘s own experience and expertise which bounds a
firm‘s search (Nelson & Winter, 1982). This leads to bounded or patterned search, the
reliance on established routines and in turn decreasing novelty in the knowledge base of
the firm and increasing bias in its investments towards exploitation of its existing
knowledge base.
Exploration and exploitation emerge from firms‘ contradictory knowledge
processing capabilities (Floyd & Lane, 2000) and compete for the scarce resources of the
firm. Engaging exploration requires different sets of capabilities than those necessary for
exploitation and firms‘ ability to identify and build these capabilities within its
boundaries is a source of competitive advantage. However, research has shown that
exploration and exploitation can be independent and firms can indeed pursue high levels
of the two concurrently (Beckman, 2006; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Lubatkin, Simsek,
Ling, & Veiga, 2006). Therefore, in conceptual discussions of ambidexterity, we follow
Cao et al. (2009) and focus on the balanced dimension of ambidexterity. In doing so we
concur that a closer match in the relative magnitude of exploratory and exploitative
activities contributes more to firm performance.
4

In exploring these capabilities as a source of competitive advantages however, a
large body of the management literature has focused almost solely on large publiclyowned businesses or technology ventures. While a growing number of research articles
have begun to recognize the importance of studies on family firms (Chrisman, Chua, &
Sharma, 2005), to the authors‘ knowledge, the issue of organizational adaptation,
specifically exploration and exploitation, has not been addressed within the context of
family firms.
Research on family firms has gained momentum in the last several years (e.g.
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice (May 2005, special issue, vol. 29, no. 3); Journal
of Business Venturing (September 2003, special issue, vol. 18, no. 5). This is especially
understandable, because the research has shown that the family firms represent a
substantial portion of the U.S. economy (Shanker & Astrachan, 1996) and are the most
common form of corporate ownership in the U.S. (La Porta, Lopez-de-Salanes, &
Shleifer, 1999). Building on prior work, in this paper we define family firms as firms
where there is both significant family ownership and family presence in management
(Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999; Kelly, Athanassiou, & Crittenden, 2000). This type
of ownership and management make the firms unique in the sense that it gives us a
context where family and business lives intertwine (Chrisman et al., 2005). In the family
firms literature, the involvement of family in the ownership and management and the
resulting bundle of resources is referred as ―familiness‖ (Habbershon & Williams, 1999)
and has been shown to motivate several salient and unique strategic behaviors
(Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003).
Like other forms of firms, family firms are also impacted by changes in their
business environment. In times of environmental change enhancing firms‘ existing
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capabilities and technologies through exploitation ensures their current viability, while
experimentation and flexibility through exploration insure their future viability (Levinthal
& March 1993). Since ―familiness‖ motivates the family firms to engage in unique
strategic behaviors (Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003), we argue that
the opportunities and constraints brought about by family firms‘ unique context can affect
their strategic choices regarding investments in exploration and exploitation. Specifically,
we ask how family ownership and family involvement in management (or familiness),
specifically the characteristics of the familiness, affect the family firms‘ investments in
explorative and exploitative activities?
In addressing this question we explore the conditions that are unique to family firms
and develop a theoretical model of how these characteristics will impact the firm‘s
investment in exploration and exploitation activities. Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2006)
suggest that, family firms invest for the long-term (pp.732). In other words, familiness
focuses resources investment decisions in the firm on optimizing, long-term value. Such a
long-term approach to management (also see Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Sirmon & Hitt,
2003), should correlate with more investments in explorative activities such as
investments in research and development, new ideas, markets or relations since they have
less immediate and certain outcomes and require longer time horizons (March, 1991).
Similarly Sirmon, Arregle, Hitt and Webb (2008) show that in the presence of a threat of
imitation family firms respond more positively by investing in research and development
activities demonstrating family firms‘ preference for long-term initiatives. However,
when we take into account the very nature of such long-term oriented investments, Le
Breton-Miller and Miller (2006) argue that these investments take the form of activities
that are directed towards capability creation and the refinement of central competencies.
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From this standpoint, family firms should devote more resources and investments to
exploitation since improvements in competence at existing procedures make
experimentation with others (i.e. exploration) less attractive (Levitt & March, 1988).
Moreover, due to the concentration of the family‘s wealth in a single firm and their
limited ability to diversify their wealth without diluting their control of their firm, there is
greater risk-aversion in family firms (La Porta et al., 1999) which will result in
investments that are more certain, less ambiguous, more predictable with a shorter time to
payback. In other words, family control may bias firm towards investment in the
exploitation of existing resources rather then exploration for new resources and
capabilities.
What the preceding arguments make clear is that family firms are unlikely to be
uniquely biased for or against one form of organizational adaptation, but rather that a
family firm‘s bias for or against exploration or exploitation is likely to be determined by
the characteristics of the family ownership, but which characteristics? While there may
be many characteristics of a particular firm that influence the decisions surrounding
exploration and exploitation, it is governance which provides family firms their distinct
character. Governance has been shown to have a significant impact on the way managers
develop internal routines, processes and systems (Lazonick & O‘Sullivan, 2002) which
are very likely to influence the choice between exploration and exploitation. Also,
governance impacts the way firms deal with external entities such as their suppliers and
customers (Williamson, 1985). Accordingly, we believe that it is mainly the
characteristics of these businesses governance structure that will influence their biases in
regards to exploration and exploitation activities. Therefore, the focus of this article will
be the governance characteristics of family firms that foster the firms‘ investment in
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exploration.
Theory Development and Propositions
It is established in the family enterprises‘ literature that family enterprises have
unique governance characteristics that distinguish them from non-family firms. However,
some of these characteristics may bias them to disproportionately invest in either
exploratory or exploitative activities. This might lead to deteriorating firm performance
since, organizations need to be aligned to both exploration and exploitation to achieve
superior performance (March, 1991; Tushman & O‘Reilly, 1996; Katila & Ahuja, 2002).
In the following pages we will develop a model, including propositions, regarding
specific characteristics of the governance structures of family firm (e.g. tenure of the lead
family member) that will influence the family firms‘ investments in exploratory or
exploitative activities.
The Role of Family Control
CEO tenure:
It is well documented that family business CEOs tend to have a substantially longer
tenure than CEO‘s of public companies (Lansberg, 1999; Ward, 2004). Le Breton- Miller
and Miller (2006) suggest that long CEO tenure in family businesses is very much linked
to sustained pursuit of a particular strategy. While sustained strategic direction is
generally a desirable characteristic, it biases the firm towards investments directly in
maintaining the status quo or closely related to the status quo. The anticipation of lengthy
tenures also drives some leaders to take a farsighted, steward like perspective of the
business. It is also acknowledge that long tenures of family member CEOs may give
them more discretion over the choice between investing in exploration or exploitation
activities. It has also been shown that long tenure makes CEO‘s reluctant to engage in
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risky expedients such as unrelated diversifications, hazardous acquisitions, or
shortsighted downsizing, which drain resources and may haunt them later in their tenures
(Amihud & Lev, 1999; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990). Musteen, Barker and Baeten
(2006) also show that there is a central tendency of CEOs to become more conservative
as their tenure increases. Other habits that may be born of protracted tenures are
conservative financial leverage, careful cash management, and assiduous preservation of
resources (Dreux, 1990). Research indicates that over time family firms have a tendency
to become more conservative and less willing to take the risks associated with
entrepreneurial activities. Zahra (2005) for example, found that one of the main indicators
of decreasing entrepreneurial activities is the long tenure of CEO founders. Similarly,
Richard, Wu and Chadwick (2009) in their recent study, found that CEO tenure
negatively moderates the entrepreneurial orientation and performance relationship. Prior
work has argued that bias towards conservatism and risk aversion over CEO tenure
occurs because of the high risk of failure among entrepreneurial ventures (Morris, 1998),
as well as the risk of destruction of family wealth (Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 1997).
We concur with this reasoning. All of these findings argue for a bias towards investment
in exploitative projects which are ‗are positive, proximate, and predictable‘ and away
from investment in exploratory projects which are characterized by high variance and
having returns that ‗are uncertain, distant and often negative‘ (March, 1991). Hence we
propose that lengthy tenures of the generation in control of the family enterprise will
make investments in explorative activities less attractive.
Proposition 1: As The tenure of the family CEO in control of the family firm
lengthens the firm will decrease its investment in explorative activities.

The role of senior management:
9

In terms of governance, family firms are also characterized by managerial positions
occupied by close kinship ties and familial management transfers (Cabrera-Suarez, De
Saa-Perez, & Garcia-Almeida, 2001; Miller, Steier, & Le Breton-Miller, 2003). GomezMejia, Nunez-Nickel, and Gutierrez (2001) show that family firms have higher levels of
managerial entrenchment due to the reduced effectiveness of monitoring managers.
Consequently, they are more likely to preserve their wealth through political lobbying
(Morck, Strangeland, & Yeung, 1998) rather than funding innovative ventures. Research
on family enterprises based on agency literature suggests that such a family control when
combined with altruism and managerial entrenchment (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003;
Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001) can prevent investment in the development
of new capabilities (Chrisman et al., 2005). Research suggests that increased levels of
management entrenchment lead them to make decisions that are bias towards enhancing
personal wealth rather then re-investing to the firm (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Morck et
al., 1998). Chandler (1990) also views family firms as being overly concerned with
wealth preservation and ill-equipped to develop organizational capabilities that are
suitable for technologically advanced industries.
The entrenchment of family members in senior leadership positions also deters
exploration because it limits the variation in information access and the potential for
novel combinations. The advantages of family leadership, shared norms, values, and
common experiences, also inherently limit the potential for novel combinations of
information available to the management team, since much of the knowledge, viewpoint,
thought processes and norms are shared by the family members of the leadership team.
The lack of novelty limits the investment opportunities in exploration and the potential
returns to innovation, which will in turn bias investment towards exploitation and away
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from exploration.
Over time the entrenchment of family members in the senior management positions
may lead to groupthink (Nordqvist, 2005). Groupthink refers to "a mode of thinking that
people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the
members' striving for unanimity overrides their motivation to realistically appraise
alternative courses of action" (Janis, 1982, p. 9).Groupthink by its vey nature leads to the
rejection of novel ideas and the failure of the family enterprise to incorporate outside
perspectives. So as the entrenchment of the family in the senior leadership persists over
time the impact of this entrenchment on the investment decisions of the family business
will increase, which will lead to greater bias towards investment in exploitation and away
from investment in exploration. This pattern can be mitigated with a change in the senior
management. As new blood enters the team the patterns that lead to groupthink will be
disrupted, decreasing managerial entrenchment, increasing the potential novelty of
information available to the family enterprise, which in turn opens up new opportunities
for investment in exploratory activities. A classic example is the entry of the Maytag
family in to the blue cheese business within a year of a new generation coming to the
helm of the family enterprise (Maytag Diary Farms, 2009). This leads to the following
propositions:

Proposition 1a: As the proportion of senior management positions controlled by the
family increases the firm will decrease investments in explorative activities.
Proposition 1b: There will be an interaction between the proportion of senior
management positions controlled by the family and the tenure of the family
members in control of the enterprise such that the negative impact on exploratory
activities will increase as both the average tenure of the family members increase
and the proportion of senior management positions controlled by the family
increases.
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The role of younger generation:
Family firms by definition are concerned with the sustainability of the business
across generations with the older generation of leadership seeing themselves as stewards
of the family enterprise (Chua et al., 1999). The literature also suggests that for family
firms to perform well members of younger generation must be integrated into the family
business (Stavrou, 1999). While existing generations who lead the family
enterprise are often reluctant to let younger generations join in the decision making of the
business they do look for opportunities for the younger generation to prove themselves
(Stavrou, 1999) and investment in new products, services and markets, exploratory
activities, present just such an opportunity. The entry of a younger generation also brings
new knowledge, information, values, ways of thinking and ideas into the family
enterprise which increases the potential for valuable and novel new combinations of the
information and skills available to the family enterprise. Enhancing the potential return to
investment in exploratory activity as the younger generation enters the family enterprise.
In addition, given the potential indulgence of the younger generation due to altruism
(Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003) the older generation of leaders will be biased towards
investing in these new ideas in hopes that the younger generation will succeed and to
placate the younger generation in hopes of avoiding intergenerational conflict. Prior
research supports this contention, showing that the involvement of the younger
generations of the family firm enhances entrepreneurial activities such as innovation and
new venture creation (Salvato, 2004). Accordingly we suggest that:
Proposition 1c: The entry of the younger generation into the management of the
family firm will lead to higher levels of investment in explorative activities.

Dispersion of family ownership:
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The structure of the ownership of the family‘s ownership of the enterprise also creates
unique incentives that may bias the enterprise towards or away form investments in
exploration or exploitation. Two characteristics of the family‘s ownership are of
particular interest the dispersion of the ownership among family members and the
proportion of the family owners directly employed by the enterprise. Recent research has
established that the declining performance of some family-run groups over time is in part
due to infighting among rival family members for group resources as control becomes
more diluted. Powerful insiders compete against each other in a race to the bottom to
extract resources out of the firm before other family members (Bertrand, et. al., 2008).
Schulze, et. al. (2003) find that ―dispersion of ownership can give outside shareholders at
private family firms the incentive to favor consumption‖. These two findings make a
powerful case that as family ownership is dispersed the time horizon for investment will
shorten, demands for the extraction of resources will increase and the family enterprise‘s
investment in the projects that can be characterized as high variance and having returns
that ‗are uncertain, distant and often negative‘, exploratory projects, will decrease.
Moreover, it is suggested that dispersion of ownership, which generally comes with
passing control to later generations, may weaken the entrepreneurial spirit and increase
the willingness to divest resources rather than investing in projects that are exploratory in
nature. With the dispersion of ownership of the family firm, it becomes harder to
maintain control over the family business. This might intensify the potential endowment
effects and the willingness to undertake riskier investments might decrease (Shepherd &
Zacharakis, 2000).
Proposition 1d: The dispersion of the ownership of the family firm will lead to
lower levels of investment in explorative activities.
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Dispersion often comes in later generations. Over time, the family firm moves away
from the first generation and the ownership gets more dispersed (Gersick, Davis,
Hampton, & Lansberg, 1997). Therefore, we suggest that the negative relationship
between the dispersion of the ownership of the family firm and investments in
exploratory activities will be moderated by the age of the family firm. As such:
Proposition 1e: There will be an interaction between the dispersion of the
ownership of the family firm and the age of the family firm, such that the negative
impact on exploratory activities will increase as both the dispersion of the
ownership of the family firm increase and the firm age increases.
Percentage of family members employed:
We argue that investments toward organizational adaptation (or exploration and
exploitation) within the context of family firms are important, since the long-term
survival of organizations may rely on both exploration and exploitation (March 1991).
Exploration without exploitation can lead to too many underdeveloped ideas and loss of
distinctive advantages, while exploitation without exploration runs the risk of being
selected out by environmental changes. Investments in explorative activities show a
desire by the firm to discover new opportunities and to build new competencies in order
to adapt to the environment (Koza & Lewin, 1998). Investments in exploitative activities,
on the other hand, are built on firms‘ aim to leverage existing capabilities; the goal is to
reap economic return from prior exploration activities (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004).
Further, as investments in explorative and exploitative activities are competing for
limited resources in a firm, they are more likely to be at two ends of a continuum (March,
1991; Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006). Some firms, in that regard, are more positioned
towards investing in exploitative activities, while others tend towards explorative.
Slack resources, defined as the resource difference between those under a firm‘s
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control and the minimum amount required for its survival (Cyert & March, 1963; Nohria
& Gulati, 1996), can be regarded as a sort of resource endowment because slack, or its
absence, is the cumulative legacy of past performance and reflects the resource stock that
a firm has accumulated over time (Amason & Mooney, 2002).
As one of the important characteristics of family firms, we concur with the
previous literature that they are characterized with less agency costs (Fama & Jensen,
1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Family involvement increases the alignment, or
unification (Carney, 2005), between firm ownership and control, thereby reducing
traditional agency costs and increasing stewardship behavior (Davis et al., 1997). Within
the context of family firms, we argue that less agency costs might transfer into more slack
resources available to the family firms, which in turn will induce them to invest more in
explorative activities for several reasons. First, slack resources act as a facilitator of new
strategic behavior, since it is the resource that is in excess of the amount required for that
firm‘s survival. Family firms with slack resource have the ability to look for alternatives
and experiment with new strategies (Nohria & Gulati, 1996). Second, family firms with a
high level of slack resource also have the motivation to invest in explorative activities.
Slack resource provides insurance to a firm‘s current viability, allowing it to devote more
attention to the concerns of future viability. Explorative activities, rather than
exploitative, addresses this concern as they complement firms‘ need for adaptation. In
with an increase in slack resources managers become less concerned about the risks of
failure, since slack resources give them extra resources to buffer the organization from
losses due to such failures.
Moreover, contrary to the negative arguments of the effects of altruism on family
firms (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003),
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that is the view of altruism which causes free riding, biased perception and indulgence of
the younger generation, from a stewardship perspective (Davis et al., 1997) we argue that
this indulgence will lead family firms to allow the younger generation wider latitude to
pursue and invest in more exploratory activities.
Therefore from both agency and stewardship perspectives we suggest that:
Proposition 1f: The proportion of family owners employed in the firm will lead to
higher levels of investments in explorative activities.

While slack resources offer organizations resources to invest in exploratory
activities, they might also include the socioemotional wealth. Family firms are generally
loss averse when it comes to threats to their socioemotional wealth (relinquishing family
control) even if this means accepting a greater performance hazard (Gomez-Mejia et al.,
2007). Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) also suggest that for family-owned firms, preserving
the family‘s socioemotional wealth represents a major issue. Moreover, family firms
literature suggests that as the family ownership and management increase, family‘s
attachment to the organization also increases (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999, 2003;
Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003). Therefore, after a certain threshold, as the proportion
of family owners employed in the firm increase, it might become more difficult to engage
in risky expedients such as explorative investments. Thus,
Proposition 1g: The proportion of family owners employed in the firm will have an
inverted-U shaped relationship with the levels of investments in explorative
activities.

The Role of Relationships with Outside Partners
Sustainability:
In addition to having a unique governance structure, family firms also differ from
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non-family firms in terms of their relationships with their outside partners. For example
Lyman (1991) shows that managers of family firms use a more personal approach and
trust their employees more. This in turn contributes to long-term orientation towards their
employees, clients and outside partners. However, literature has found that, in
relationships with outside partners, partner turnover will be higher in projects related to
exploration rather than exploitation (Dittrich & Duysters, 2007). Such changing most of
the time offer firms the flexibility, innovation and ability to smoothly adjust to changing
environmental conditions. While long-term orientation in relationships can bring success
in certain aspects of the business, we suggest that this nature of family firms may retard
their investments related to organizational exploration.
Proposition 2: The length of the family’s sustained relationships with employees,
clients and outside partners will lead to lower levels of investments in explorative
activities.
Tenure of employees:
Miller and Le Breton-Miller‘s (2005) work suggests that family firms particularly
recognize that employees are important assets for the knowledge base of the company
and thus should be treated with more consideration. Davis et al. (1997) also argue that
family owner managers feel more emotional attachment and responsibility for those who
work for them. While these behaviors benefit the family firms through fewer layoffs and
lower levels of turnover (Miller & Le-Breton-Miller, 2003; 2005), it also has a price.
Almeida and Rosenkopf (2003) highlight the importance of employee mobility in
overcoming search biases and spurring exploration. Longer tenure by employees and
lower turnover equates to lower levels of new information and knowledge being
incorporated in to the family enterprise. As noted earlier, the flow of new knowledge and
information into the firms is an important precursor for the creation of novel
17

recombination requiring exploration. Therefore as the tenure of the family enterprises
employees increases the firm will surface fewer opportunities for exploration and will
decrease their investment in exploratory activities.
Proposition 2a: The average tenure of the employees will lead to lower levels of
investments in explorative activities.
Long-time clients:
Similarly, family firms tend to have long-term associations and enduring
relationships with their outside stakeholders such as their clients, alliance partners and
suppliers. Family firms particularly benefit from such long-term relationships by
sustaining the business in times of trouble and by having superior customer loyalty (Le
Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006). Strategic management literature points out that firms
benefit from relationships from outside stakeholders through knowledge transfer that is
novel to the firm (Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996; Dyer & Singh, 1998). However,
intimate, recurrent and trustful relationships, as in the case of enduring relationships of
family firms, are generally considered to be useful when firms aim at exploitation rather
than exploration (Krackhardt, 1992). This is because firms need to make the most of
established technologies and products, and the intense, trustworthy relationships with
partners in order to exploit knowledge. Exploitation is characterized by routine learning,
which only adds to the existing knowledge and competencies of a firm without changing
the nature of its activities (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002). Exploration, on the other hand
is a non-routinized learning that involves frequent changes and experimentation with new
alternatives.
Proposition 2b: The proportion of a family business’s revenues generated from long
time clients will lead to lower levels of investments in explorative activities.
******************** Insert Figure 1 about here ********************
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Summary and Conclusions
The competitive nature of today‘s business environment requires that firms adapt to
changes in the environment. In essence, successful firms are the ones which are not only
efficient in their management of today‘s business demands but also adaptive to changes
in the environment (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Therefore, similar to non-family firms,
family firms should develop the mindset and the organizational mechanisms that will
allow them to successfully respond to the uncertainty and changes in this competitive
landscape. However what characteristics of the family enterprise will impact its ability to
respond? In this paper we have put forth a model that develops the relationship between
the governance characteristics of a family enterprise and its investment in exploratory and
exploitative activities.
In this article, we focus on two areas of family enterprises that will affect their
investments in capability creating, exploratory activities. First, both from stewardship and
agency perspectives, we argue that the governance and ownership characteristics of
family enterprises will effect their investment in exploratory and exploitative activities.
Specifically we propose that the tenure of the generation in control, the proportion of
senior management positions controlled by the family and the dispersion of family
ownership bias them against investments in exploratory activities. However, our model
also suggests that bringing the younger generation in to the firm will increase the firm‘s
investment in exploratory activities and that the transfer of control to the younger
generation will increase the firm‘s investment in exploration. We also propose that as the
proportion of family owners employed by the enterprise increases the firm will increase
its investment in exploratory activities.
Second, we look at the inherent relationship structure of family firms with its
19

employees and outside partners. The outcome of the relation-specific structure gives us a
unique pattern of family firms with sustainable relationships. While this might seem
plausible especially when we take into account the long term perspective of most family
firms (Le Breton Miller & Miller, 2006), it might have detrimental effects to firm
performance especially when environmental changes require the development of new
technological capabilities. The lack of turnover and the lengthy tenure of a family
enterprises employment base decrease the inflow of new knowledge and information into
the firm, which leads them to discover fewer exploratory opportunities and in turn leads
to lower investment in exploratory activities. Similarly stability in the family enterprises
external relations decreases the flow of new information and knowledge into the firm and
leads to decreased investment in exploratory activities.
From a theoretical standpoint and within the context of organizational adaptation,
our article also shows that when examining investments in exploration and exploitation,
the two seemingly contradictory theories or stewardship and agency can be reconciled. In
fact the predictions of both theories regarding the impact of the entry of the younger
generation into the firm are quite similar – greater investment in exploration. However, at
the margin the agency argument based on altruism, seems to lead to an expectation that
this investment would be less beneficial to the firm, since it is based not on reason but
rather emotion. In contrast stewardship theory seems to argue that this is a rational,
maximizing behavior that will enhance the performance and survival of the family
enterprise. This is really an empirical question, which needs to be addressed in future
research.
Future research in this area could begin by testing the propositions put forth in this
paper, as well as examining the relationship between the levels of investment in
20

exploration and exploitation and family enterprise performance and survival over time.
The ambidexterity hypothesis and research on exploration and exploitation have become
an influential research stream in management an important. However to date the research
has a blind spot – family enterprise, and research on family enterprise also has a clear
blind spot – research on exploration and exploitation. The importance of this area of
research is well established, but it is the intersection of those two that we believe
demands the attention of future research.
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Figure 1
Summary of Suggested Propositions
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